Benutzer:Kl833x9/Doihara (1932-1940)

Eine gute Erklärung für die japanische Politik der 1930er Jahre in China bietet Teitler, Radtke: A Dutch Spy in China S. 2-3. Weil Japans Wirtschaftskraft noch zu schwach war, um auf chinesischem Boden eine ernsthafte Konkurrenz zu den Vereinigten Staaten und Großbritannien darzustellen, versuchte man durch Unterbrechung der Verbindungen der Regierung in Nanking nach Nordchina und die Schwächung britischen Einflusses an Bedeutung zu gewinnen. Das war der Hauptgrund für:

• die Versuche ein "unabhängiges" Nordchina (Mandschukuo) herzustellen (1929-1932, Doihara stark beteiligt)
• die Schmuggel-Operationen (Opium, siehe Seagrave, Seagrave 2003) in Nordchina (1934-1936, wahrscheinlich Doihara beteiligt)
• Versuche die mit britischer Hilfe durchgeführte Währungsreform in China zu unterbinden (November 1935, wahrscheinlich Doihara beteiligt)
• fehlgeschlagene Versuche die Vorherrschaft in China durch die Einrichtung von lokalen, japantreuen Marionettenregierungen zu erringen (1935 - 1936, Doihara federführend beteiligt) andere Bewertung von Doiharas Tätigkeit durch John Gunther, Inside Asia, S. 122: [Doihara] almost got by facility in negotiation (of course he was negotiating mostly with prostrate and corrupt Chinese underlings) and [nearly] without firing a shot what it took the Japanese army years of expensive and bloody warfare to get later.
• den Ausbruch des Zweiten Japanisch-Chinesischen Krieges (1937-1945, Doihara von 1937 - 1938 an Kampfhandlungen beteiligt)
• spätere Versuche, nach Ausbruch des Zweiten Japanisch-Chinesischen Krieges, eine Gegenregierung unter Wang Jingwei aufzubauen, um den chinesischen Widerstand zu brechen. (1938-1941, Doihara stark beteiligt, favourisierte zunächst Wu Peifu)

Randbemerkungen

• Peking hieß zu dieser Zeit Peiping: Aus „nördliche Hauptstadt" Peking wird „der nördliche Friede" Peiping

Stabilisierung von Mandschukuo

• John J. Stephan: The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925-1945; Harper & Row, 1978; ISBN 0060140992 , S.62: Harbin did not fall until February 2, 1932, although "Lawrence" Doihara and his Tokumu Kikan operatives had been softening up the city for two or three months.

• Li Narangoa: Japanische Religionspolitik in der Mongolei 1932-1945: Reformbestrebungen und Dialog zwischen japanischem und mongolischem Buddhismus; Harrassowitz, 1998; ISBN 3447040289, S. 31:
  [...] Die Harbiner Tokumukikan-Niederlassung befaßte sich unter der Leitung von Doihara mit Sibirien und der äußeren Mongolei [...]

Expansion der japanischen Einflusssphäre nach Nordchina und die innere Mongolei

• Hans Brosius: Fernost formt seine neue Gestalt, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft 1936, S. 109: [Die Japaner besetzten die] Provinz Jehol, die nicht zur Mandschurei sondern zur inneren Mongolei gehört. Damit schoben sie die Grenze des neuen Staates bis dicht vor die Tore von Peking vor. Die Begründung für dieser Eroberung war sehr einfach. Mongolische Bünde in Jehol traten für den Anschluss der Provinz an den neuen Staat ein. Das ist totaler Schmarrn. Siehe für genauen Vorgang David Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy S. 537-542, Doihara hatte mit der Besetzung der Provinz Jehol nichts zu tun, weil er eine militärische Pflichtübung absolvieren musste: Von 1932 bis 1933 war Doihara Befehlshaber der 9. Infanterie-Brigade der 5. Japanischen Division.

• Bergamini: Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, S. 541: Hirohito followed it up in March [1933] by assigning [...] Major General Doihara, to the task of buying Chinese Leaders througout north China and Mongolia and sponsoring them to found their own regimes autonomous of Nanking.
• Kenneth Bourne, Ann Trotter, Donald Cameron Watt, Great Britain Foreign Office: British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print Vol. 13: January 1934 - December 1934, University Publications of America, 1997, ISBN 0890936129 S.160: [...] a copy of his despatch No. 13 to his Majesty's Ambassador, Tokyo, of today date, repecting conversations with General Doihara and the Soviet consul-general, Mukden, March 29, 1934.
• Institute for Advanced Chinese Studies: Chinese Culture, Chinese Cultural Research Institute Taipei 1977, S. 78: On April 18, 1934, the Japanese Mukden Special Service Agency submitted a document with the title "Draft for Saving North China" to the Chief of Staff in Tokyo [...]
• Mark Gayn: The Fight for the Pacific, W. Morrow & Company, 1941, S. 211: In 1934 Doihara, by this time elevated to the command of the Kwantung Special Service Agency began to branch out [...]
• Eugene William Levich: The Kwangsi Way in Kuomintang China, 1931-1939; M.E. Sharpe, 1993; ISBN 1563242001; S. 26: An unusual increase in the number of Japanese visitors to Kwangsi took place in 1934. [...] The notorious imperialist intriguer General Doihara Kenji was one of the visitors (in late 1934 or early 1935). Was macht Doihara in Südchina - eine unverbindliche Informationsreise ohne konkretes Projekt.
• Harold Scott Quigley, George Hubbard Blakeslee, World Peace Foundation: The Far East: An International Survey Johnson Reprint Corp., 1966, S. 84 + Coble: Facing Japan S.199: During 1934 Japan was deeply concerned with the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway [from the Soviet Union]. When that problem was settled on march 23 1935, when the Soviet Union sold their interests at the railway line to Japan, pressure again [was raised].

• Dryburgh: North China and Japanese Expansion 1933-1937, S. 60: Plan fünf nördliche Provinzen (Chahar, Hebei, Shandong, Shanxi, Suiyuan) vom chinesischen Kernland zu trennen
• Dryburgh S. 61: The leadership [of the Japanese-sponsored 'north china autonomy movement'] is commonly attributed to Doihara Kenji [...]
• Boyle: China and Japan at War, S. 35: Am 7. Dezember 1934 fand eine wichtige Versammlung des inneren japanischen Regierungskabinetts statt und es wurde nun die offizielle japanische Politik, den Einfluss der Nankinger Zentralregierung auf Nordchina einzuschränken.
• Alvin D. Coox, Hilary Conroy: China and Japan: Search for Balance Since World War I, ABC-Clio Books, 1978, ISBN 087436275X, S.182 After the formulation of its China policy, the Kwantung Army began seriously looking for a pretext to enter North China. Meanwhile Doihara continued in his familar post as chief of the Mukden Special Service Organ.
  [...] In February 1935, Doihara made a special trip to North China at the order of the [...]
• Hans Brosius: Fernost formt seine neue Gestalt, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft m. b. h., 1942, S.143: Schon im Frühjahr 1935 war Doihara in [Nord]China gewesen. Zwei Monate war er im ganzen Lande herumgereist, hatte die Stimmung der Bevölkerung in Nordchina sondiert, Möglichkeiten für seine Pläne erkundet.
• Dryburgh: North China and Japanese Expansion 1933-1937, S. 61: Gewinnung von Personen für das North China Autonomy Movement: Versuch neben den als pro-japanisch bekannten chinesischen Beamten auch regierende Offizielle (Song Zheyuan) und eine breite Basis in der Bevölkerung zu gewinnen, indem die Konflikte zwischen lokaler Bevölkerung und Zentralregierung geschürt wurden.

• Boyle: China and Japan at War, S. 35: Doihara was building a reputation as the most political of Japan's political generals, and was developing an idee fixe on his own talents for manipulating tractable Chinese warlords. "As a person he was a splendid gentleman" writes a Japanese contemporary ",but he never learned from the past and just went on repeating the same old anachronistic corrupt operations."

• Michael A. Barnhart: Japan Prepares for Total War S.40: The first chance to implement this policy [of excluding the Kuomintang authority from the region of Tientsin and Peiping] came in May 1935, when several anti-Japanese demonstrations broke out in Tientsin and Peking. Two colonel visited local chinese Authorities in Peking [...] to demand the complete removal of all Kuomintang advisers from the north and the creation of an autonomous political organ in the two-city area [...]
• Butow: Tojo And the Coming of the War S. 78-79: Weiterer Grund für das Vorgehen Doiharas: By the summer of 1935 [...] such Manchurian adventurers as Itagaki and Doihara were busily trying to organize "autonomous" governments in those regions of China. The establishment of such governments would permit Japan to obtain control over all of North China [...] without leaving the telltale traces of complicity revealed at the time of the Manchurian Incident. The Western powers might suspect the truth, but they would have greater difficulty proving it.
• Coble: Facing Japan S. 208: Nord-Chahar-Zwischenfall war der Auslöser für das Zustandekommen der Doihara-Qin-Vereinbarung. Vier japanische Agenten in Chahar, die sich auf dem Weg von Dolonor nach Kalgan befanden, wurden am 5. Juni 1935 verhaftet und später wieder freigelassen.
• Dryburgh S. 41: In den Zeitraum Juni-Juli 1935 fällt die Doihara-Qin-Vereinbarung: [...] Xiao [Zhenying] rejected Qin Dechuns proposal that they negotiate with Doihara through Chen Juesheng, arguing that Chen, a close associate of Huang Fu, was too conciliatory towards the Japanese., da braucht es dann auch keinen umfangreicheren Artikel darüber.
• Nihon Gaiji Kyōkai: Contemporary Japan: A Review of Japanese Affairs The Foreign affairs association of Japan., 1936, S. 298: June 23 [1935]: Negotiations for settlement of the Chahar incident are opened at Peiping between Major- General Doihara and General Chin Te-shun (Qin Dechun) [...]
• Coble: Facing Japan S. 208: Doihara threatened military action if the demands were not met and the Kwantung forces gathered at the Jehol border. On June 27 [1935], therefore Qin handed Takahashi Tan a note accepting the Japanese demands.

Doihara fails

• Gute Zusammenfassung in Peter Duus, John Whitney Hall, Donald H Shively: The Cambridge History of Japan - Volume 6: The Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press, 1988; ISBN 0521223571, S. 300-301: Nach der Unterzeichnung der Umezo-Ho und Doihara-Qin-Vereinbarungen wurde Doihara nach Nordchina entsandt, wo er ein pro-japanisches autonomes Regime durch die Einbindung verschiedener Warlords auf dem Gebiet der fünf Nordprovinzen zu errichten versuchte. Aufgrund erfolgreicher politischer Intervention der Kuomintang-Regierung schlug dieser Plan fehl, obwohl den Japanern die Installation eines autonomen Rates in Ost-Hebei gelang. Dieser autonome Rat wurde aber durch die Einrichtung eines Hebei-Chahar-Rates auf chinesischer Seite ad absurdum geführt. Erfolgreicher war die Schaffung eines autonomen mongolischen Staatsgebildes auf dem Gebiet der Provinzen Chahar und Suiyuan (Provinz) unter Prinz Te im Mai 1936, das den Namen Mengjiang tragen sollte. Doihara führte seit Juni 1934 mit Prinz Te Gespräche über die mongolische Autonomie und hatte daher auch hier einen großen Anteil an der Schaffung dieses Marionettenstaates. Chinesische Proteste and die Adresse der japanischen Regierung und Einwände von Kanji Ishiwara, der eine wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Mandschukuos anstelle einer unkontrollierten Expansion beführwortete, führten zur Versetzung Doiharas nach Japan im März 1936.

• Dryburgh: North China and Japanese Expansion 1933-1937, S. 61: The leadership of the North China Autonomy Movement ist commonly attributed to Doihara Kenji, GDA special services officer [...]. In practice efforts to secure leadership of the autonomy movement reflected competition between the [GDA and the NCGA (japanische Nordchinaarmee)] for influence in Hebei-Chahar and it is clear that the NCGA too had a substantial stake in the movement.
• David P. Barrett, Lawrence N. Shyu, Larry Shyu: Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation, Stanford University Press 2001, ISBN 0804737681, S. 46: Under the direction of Doihara Kenji, Kwantung Army special services chief in Changchun, Japanese Army pressure on northern political leaders to participate in an autonomous North China was [in September, early October 1935] intensified. Retired politicians such as Cao Kun, Wu Peifu and Duan Qirui were targeted. Doihara versuchte, die alten Warlords der 1920er Jahre für das North China Autonomy Movement zu reaktivieren.
• Dryburgh: North China and Japanese Expansion 1933-1937, S. 61: The north china autonomy movement created new stresses between [provinz gouveneur chahar] Song Zheyuan and Nanjing.
• Stephen R. MacKinnon, Diana Lary, Ezra F. Vogel: China at War: Regions of China, 1937-1945; Stanford University Press, 2007; ISBN 0804755094; S. 152: In September [1935], the commander of the Japanese occupation force in north China, Hayao Tada, published the North China Autonomy Statement and the GD Army sent Doihara Kenji to Tianjin to work with the Japanese occupation force in north China in implementing the plan.

• Dryburgh: North China and Japanese Expansion 1933-1937, S. 63: The movement itself fell into three stages. In September and October most activity centered on Japanese overtures to senior nother officials, including Song Zheyuan and other provincial governors and propaganda work, which made it clear that the Japanese [...] were not willing to deal with Nanjing on matters affecting north China. With the beginning of the second stage in late October, the Japanese [...] began to increase pressure openly on North China officials [...] culminated in the establishment of an autonomous organisation in east Hebei [...] in late November. The creation of an autonomous regime forced the central government in Nanking to engage [...] and in the third stage from December 1935 to January 1936 the Nanking government again [successfully] intervened.

• Boyle: China and Japan at War, S.125: By October 1935 Maj. Gen. Doihara Kenji [...] had convinced Prince Te that there was noc conflict between a Mongol autonomy movement and the Kwantung Army's strategic requirements.
• Barnhart: Japan Prepares for Total War, S. 42: On 6 November [1935] Doihara met with Major General Tada Hayao of the Tientsin garrison, and together they planned for a new regime for three provinces of North China, Hopei, Chahar and Shantung.
• John Israel: Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937, Stanford University Press, 1966, ISBN 0804702802, S. 112: Doihara [...] threatened invasion unless a North China Autonomous Council was established for the provinces of Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Chahar and Suiyuan. In Tientsin a Japanese-inspired "Peoples association for the Promotion of Self-Government in North China" supported his demands.
• China Society of Science and Arts, Arthur de Carle Sowerby, John Calvin Ferguson (Hrsg.): The China Journal, v.30 1939 Jan-Jun, S. 94: The situation suddenly changed on the next day. The various Chinese generals proved suddenly unwilling to take part in the scheme. Song Zheyuan left for Tientsin [...] General Doihara left Peiping and the newspapers talked about "the collapse of his self-imposed [movement]".
• Keiji Furuya, Chʻun-ming Chang: Chiang Kai-shek, His Life and Times, St. John's University Press, 1981, S. 484: [The North China Autonomy Movement] that Doihara had been advocating was about to be launched and such northern leaders as General Han Fu-chu and Shang Chen were expected to arrive in Peiping to help launch it. Chiang wired the northern leaders to refuse to deal with Doihara. Both Han and Shang cancelled their proposed visit to Peiping.
• Robert Berkov: Strong Man of China: The Story of Chiang Kai-shek, Houghton Mifflin, 1938, S. 204: Old Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi was detained [from meeting with Doihara] by urgent business.
• Doihara was left, fuming and futile, waiting for the Chinese [Shang] who never appeared.
• John Gunther, Inside Asia, S.56-57 gescheiterte Versuche die Provinzstatthalter von Shantung und Hopei für das North China Autonomy Movement zu gewinnen:
  Occasionally Doihara has been outwitted. Once [ca. Herbst 1935] he sought to wean a northern General, Shang Chen [Gouveneur von Hopei], from allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek. But the general refused to be seduced; he failed to keep an important rendezvous with Doihara, on the grounds of illness. The illness he said, was "stove poisoning"; he had sad too near an overheated stove. China rocked with laughter; Doihara was not amused.
  At another time [ca. Herbst 1935] he opened secret negotiations with Han Fu-chu, the late warlord of Shantung, to tie him to Japan. Han came to Doiharas secret headquarters at Tsinan, but refused to accept the Japanese offer. Doihara, in angry mood, said that Han would not leave the house alive, unless he acceded to the Japanese demands. Han took out his watch, and said, "How interesting. It is now 11:25. Before coming here I instructed my troops to massacre every Japanese in the city if I do not return to my headquarters by midnight. Good evening." Doihara could do nothing. Han went.
  Das erinnert ein wenig an erfolglose Staubsaugerverkäufer und Versicherungsvertreter. Andere Quelle für Shang Chen: Ann Trotter, Kenneth Bourne, Donald Cameron Watt, Great Britain. Foreign Office (Hrsg.): British Documents on Foreign Affairs April 1934 - December 1935, S. 414
• Nachdem Doihara begriffen hatte, das die Loslösung der fünf Nordprovinzen aus dem Machtbereich der chinesischen Zentralregierung mit politischen Mitteln ein unrealistisches Unterfangen war, verfolgte er einen weniger ambitionierten Plan B: Die Autonomie der Provinz Chahar. Chahar war von allen Provinzen am weitesten exponiert und daher besonders gefährdet gegenüber Angriffen des japanischen Militärs. Hinzu kam noch, das die Loyalität des Statthalters der Provinz Song Zheyuan zur Nankinger Zentralregierung nur begrenzt war.
• Dryburgh S. 71: Übersetzung eines Telegramms von Xiao Zhenying [hoher Beamter in der Provinz Chahar] an He Yingqin vom 12.10.1935: It is already an open secret that Doihara and Itagaki are pressing for rapid changes in the administration of north China and that is closely conected with Tada's declaration [...] but although they are putting great pressure on us, we have not yet given in [...]
• Barrett, Shyu, Shyu: Chinese Collaboration with Japan, S. 48: Only after months of rumours, when [Song Zheyuan in beginning of November 1935] was presented by Doihara with an ultimatum to declare autonomy for north China or face military reprisals [...]
• Dryburgh S. 83: Chiang Kai-Shek drohte den Provinzfürsten der fünf Nordprovinzen offen mit Krieg, wenn sie sich auf die Seite der Japaner schlagen würden.
• Dryburgh S. 83: BMC officials continued in [15-20. November 1935] to assume that Song Zheyuan (Chef der Provinzregierung von Chahar) and Doihara were still acting in concert on discussions of autonomy [...]
• Dryburgh S. 84: Übersetzung eines Telegramms von Chiang Kai-Shek an Bürgermeister von Qingdao vom 20. November 1935: Doihara was demanding a specific response from Song by 3 yesterday; by everyone's surprise Song left Beiping for Tianjin and refused to see him, so Xiao's [Zhenying] and Doihara's hopes were completely thwarted.
  Song Zheyuan (verärgert wegen geringer Unterstützung der Zentralregierung in Nanking) agreed to ask Doihara that the declaration [of independence] be postponed and its content revised, claiming that Xiao Zhenying, Chen Juesheng and Qin Dechun had not sought his approval for their earlier discussions. Doihara refused. (23. November 1935)
• Dryburgh S. 96: Anmerkung 57: It was rumoured that Song Zheyuan and Doihara visited Yin [Rugeng] at Tongxian that day. (25. November 1935)
• Israel, Student Nationalism in China S. 118: On November 25 [1935], Major General Doihara inaugurated the East Hopei Autonomous Council under a puppet chairman, Yin Ju-keng (Yin Rugeng). The capital of this "autonomous federation" was Tungchow (Tongxian), only thirteen miles east of Peiping. In Tientsin, the Japanese promoted demonstrations demanding self-government for the North.
• Israel, Student Nationalism in China S. 118-129: Die japanischen Aktionen lösten ab dem November 25 [1935] heftige Proteste (Demonstrationen) chinesischer Studenten in Peiping aus, die nicht hinnehmen wollten, das ihr Land durch Warlords an die Japaner verkauft wurde und ein zweites Mandschukuo aus den Nordprovinzen entstehen sollte. Die Bewegung des 9. Dezember 1935 entstand.
• Dryburgh: North China and Japanese Expansion 1933-1937, S. 105-108: Verhandlungen zwischen Doihara und Song Zheyuan zur Auflösung der autonomen Regierung unter Yin Rugeng in Tongxian im Januar 1936. Die Gespräche wurden unterbrochen als erneute Unruhen ausbrachen und im März 1936 endgültig abgebrochen als Doihara und Itagaki auf Posten im japanischen Mutterland versetzt wurden. Doihara machte klar, das er die Erweiterung der autonomen Gebiete in Hebei und Chahar wünschte. Die Chinesen gingen aber auf seine Forderungen nicht ein.
• Christiane I. Reinhold: Studying the Enemy, Routledge, 2001, ISBN 0415931827, S.60-61: negatives Resultat von Doiharas Bemühungen: Immediately leading up to the outbreak of war in 1937 was the attempt spearheaded by the leading Kwantung Army figure Kenji Doihara, to wrest North China permanently away from central control by forcing the regional commanders of Hebei-Chahar and Shandong to declare autonomy from Nanjing in 1935. [...] While Doiharas Bid failed, the autonomy scheme further roused Chinese public opinion [...] in nationwide opposition to the GMD-sponsored appeasement policy toward Japan.

• Henry George Wandesforde Woodhead, Henry Thurburn Montague Bell: The China Year Book - 1936, North China Daily News & Herald, 1936, S. 175: Auf Protest der Nankinger Zentralregierung wurde Doihara 1936 nach Japan versetzt. [...] Nanking protested, and Tokyo had Doihara transferred to Japan.

erste Phase des Zweiten Japanisch-Chinesischen Krieges

• Gerke Teitler, Kurt Werner Radtke: A Dutch Spy in China, Brill, 1999, ISBN 9004114874: Kapitel The Doihara Column at Lanfeng und The Japanese Encirclement and the Chinese Withdrawal, S.192-195 Report Nr. 11 von Colonel (ret.) H.J.D. De Fremery, Royal Netherlands Indies Army: Examining Doihara's tactics, it is difficult to draw any conclusion other than he had planned [...] to block the withdrawing Chinese troops at Lanfeng. But it seems that the plan was conceived without paying the slightest attention to the enemy with whom they had to deal.
  [...] it is incomprehensible that General Doihara was unfamiliar with the fact that there was a significant Chinese force present at Kaifeng, the capital of Honan, while his position was located less than 45 kilometres from this point, where approximately twenty [...] fresh divisions were stationed. He surely cannot have imagined that he could halt the withdrawing Chinese army ?
  Diese Beurteilung berechtigt wohl dazu, über Doihara zu schreiben, das er kein guter Militär war. Die Frage ist eigentlich, warum er als spezialisierter Nachrichtendienstler nach Ausbruch des Zweiten Japanisch-Chinesischen Krieges überhaupt Befehlshaber einer Division geworden ist. (evtl. Pflichtübung für den weiteren Aufstieg in der Hierarchie der kaiserlich-japanischen Armee ?)

• Zhang Weihan: Dai Li yu 'Juntong yu'; S.113: The single most important Japanese special unit (Tokumu Kikan) operating in China after 1938 was the Bamboo Agency (Take Kikan), or Doihara Agency which included the greatest of Japanese "Old China hands" Banzai Rihachirō. (Frederic E. Wakeman: Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service; University of California Press, 2003; ISBN 0520234073, S.516)

Wang Jingwei

• Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, 1983; ISBN 0870116282: S. 279: [Wu Peifu] was again approached by Doihara in 1938, this time to head a new [puppet government in North China]., siehe auch http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,772110,00.html
• Wen-Hsin Yeh: Wartime Shanghai, Taylor & Francis, 1998 ISBN 0415174414, S.119-120: Six months earlier, in October 1938, Tang Shaoyi, a former ambassador and Cabinet Minister, was cut down in his living room by an axe-wielding Jutong agent who had disguised himself as antique dealer. The bureau, on that occasion, had received intelligence that Tang was the choice of Doihara Kenji, the Japanese army intelligence director, to head a puppet "central government" in occupied China. To nip the negotiations in the bud, the bureau eliminated Doihara's prospective candidate.
• Wen-Hsin Yeh: Wartime Shanghai, S.139-140: chinesische Tokumu Kikan Agenten arbeiten mit Kenji Doihara zusammen: http://books.google.de/books?id=zi3WgXMKdJgC&pg=RA1-PA120&dq=kenji+doihara+shanghai#PRA1-PA139,M1
• Wurde Wang Jingwei von Doihara als Präsident der chinesischen Kollaborations-Regierung in Nanjing eingesetzt ?: Dazu Haldore E. Hanson: Humane Endeavour: The Story of the China War; Farrar & Rinehart, 1939 S. 188: [...] and was formally expelled from Chiang Kai-sheks government, Doihara immediately proceeded to Hanoi to confer with him. Wang apparently agreed to work for the Japanese propaganda department but he assumed no official position at that time. Chinese gunmen broke into Wangs home at [...]
• time: 19. dezember 1938: The prestige of Terauchi's name (his father was Minister of War throughout the Russo-Japanese War), his own rank as one of Japan's full generals and a former War Minister, and his recent military achievements and experience in North China may enable him to smooth relations between the army's two China experts, Generals Doihara and Kita, who have rival plans for China's "final" Government. Doihara is reported to favor a government with wide powers headed by old Warlord Wu Pei-fu, Kita to favor a government with severely limited powers suitable to a "puppet state" headed by Wang K'e-ming (Wang Jingwei ??), present chairman of the North-China Provisional Government.
• Hans Brosius: Fernost formt seine neue Gestalt, 1942:Der Flucht Wang-tsching-weis nach Hongkong folgten im Dezember 1938, Verhandlungen mit dem General Doihara [...]
• Wu Peifu After the second Sino-Japanese War broke out, Wu refused to cooperate with the Japanese. In 1939, when the Japanese invited him to be the leader of the puppet government in North China, Wu made a speech saying that he was willing to become the leader of North China again on behalf of the New Order in Asia, if every Japanese soldier on China's soil gave up his post and went back to Japan. He then went back into retirement, dying later under what some people considered suspicious circumstances. He was a national hero before he died, a status he had never before achieved.
• Frederic Wakeman: The Shanghai Badlands, Cambridge University Press, 2002; ISBN 0521528712, S.86-87: Aufbau eines chinesischen Geheimdienstes 1939, um Kollaborateure wie Wang Jingwei zu schützen: http://books.google.de/books?id=TbpNjDlPSq0C&pg=PA86&dq=kenji+doihara+shanghai#PPA87,M1
• Bernhard Wasserstein: Secret War in Shanghai - Treachery, Subversion and Collaboration in The Second World War; Profile Books London 1999; ISBN 1-86197-138-9 ; S. 24: Plans for the further exploitation of the zone moved into high gear when, in late 1938, the Japanese general-politician, Doihara Kenji [...] held a conference in Shanghai with renegades from the Chinese secret service. This resulted in the creation in early 1939 of a security apparatus designed to terrorize Shanghai into submission. With Japanese help, Wang Ching-wei's movement set up a police headquarters [...] in July 1939.

chinesische Quellen

• Zongren Li, Tsung-jen Li, Te-kong Tong: The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, Westview Press, 1979