Benutzer Diskussion:Sebmol/Hugo Black

Hugo LaFayette Black (*27. Februar 1886; † 25. September 1971) was ein amerikanischer Politiker and Jurist. Als Mitglied der Demokratischen Partei vertrat er von 1926 bis 1937 den Bundesstaat Alabama im Senat der Vereinigten Staaten. Nach seiner Amtszeit als Senator diente Black von 1937 bis 1971 als Richter am Obersten Gerichtshof der Vereinigten Staaten. Black wurde von Präsident Franklin D. Roosevelt zum Richter ernannt und vom Senat mit einem Ergebnis von 63 zu 13 Stimmen bestätigt.

Black ist der Richter mit der viertlängsten Amtszeit und war bekannt dafür, dass er für die wortwörtliche Interpretation der Verfassung der Vereinigten Staaten eintrat. Er war auch davon überzeugt, dass die Grundrechte der Bill of Rights seit der Verabschiedung des 14. Zusatzartikels zur Verfassung auch die Regierungen der Bundesstaaten einschränkten. Seine oft kontroverse Rechtsprechung hat zu zahlreichen Debatten geführt, da eine politische Einordnung schwer fällt. Einerseits war er ein Verfechter der Bürgerrechte und deren Umsetzung in den Vereinigten Staaten, andererseits lehnte er ein „Recht auf Privatsphäre“ als aus der Verfassung abgeleitetes Grundrecht ab.

Anfangsjahre

Hugo LaFayette Black war der Jüngste von acht Kindern im Haushalt von William Lafayette Black und Martha Toland Black. Er wurde am 27. Februar 1886 in einem kleinen Farmhaus in Harlan, einer armen, isolierten Kleinstadt im Clay County am Rande der Appalachen, geboren.

Seinem Bruder Orlando folgend, entschied sich Black zuerst, ebenfalls Mediziner zu werden. Mit 17 Jahren verließ er die Schule in Ashland und schrieb sich für das Schuljahr 1902/02 an der Birmingham Medical School ein. Orlando riet ihm jedoch stattdessen, an der University of Alabama Jura zu studieren. Nach seinem Abschluss im Juni 1906 zog Black wieder zurück nach Ashland und eröffnete eine Kanzlei über einem Lebensmittelgeschäft. Die Kanzlei war allerdings kein Erfolg und brannte anderthalb Jahre später mit dem gesamten Gebäude ab. Black zog daraufhin 1907 zurück nach Birmingham, um dort eine neue Anstellung als Anwalt zu finden. Er spezialisierte sich in Arbeits- und Schadensrecht.

Nach der Verteidigung eines Afroamerikaners, der nach seiner Verhaftung in ein Zwangsarbeitsverhältnis gebunden wurde, sprach ihn A. O. Lane, ein mit dem Verfall in Verbindung stehender Richter, an. Als Lane 1911 zum Stadtrat von Birmingham gewählt wurde, bat er Black, als Richter am Polizeigericht zu dienen. Dies war Blacks einzige Amtszeit als Richter vor seiner Ernennung zum Obersten Gerichtshof. 1912 trat Black von seinem Amt zurück, um wieder als Anwalt tätig zu werden. 1914 begann er eine vierjährige Amtszeit als Staatsanwalt für Jefferson County.

Drei Jahre später, während des Ersten Weltkriegs, trat Black abermals zurück, um in der Armee der Vereinigten Staaten zu dienen. Er schrieb sich an der Offiziersschule in Fort Oglethorpe im Bundesstaat Georgia und erreichte den Rank des Captain. Er diente in der 81. Feldartillerie in der Nähe von Chattanooge, nahm aber nie an Kampfhandlungen teil. Kurz nach Ende des Krieges kehrte Hugo im September 1918 nach Birmingham zurück, um seine Geschäfte als Anwalt weiterzuführen.

Am 23. Februar 1921 heiratete Black Josephine Forst (*1899; †1951), mit der er drei Kinder zeugte: Hugo (*1922), Sterling Foster (*1924) und Martha Josephine (*1933). Das Paar blieb verheiratet, bis Josephine nach langer Krankheit am 6. Dezember 1951 verstarb. Black heiratete 1957 Elizabeth Seay DeMeritte.

Ku-Klux-Klan-Kontroverse

In den 1920ern wurde der Ku-Klux-Klan nach einer fünfzigjährigen Pause wieder in der Politik Alabamas sowie in vielen Nordstaten und der Demokratischen Partei auf Bundesebene aktiv. In dem Jahrzehnt zählte die Organisation in Alabama um die 85.000 Mitglier und übte einen bedeutenden Einfluss auf den Wahlen des Bundesstaats aus.

Am 11. August 1921 wurde Black gebeten, den Geistlichen Edwin R. Stephenson zu verteidigen. Stephenson wurde als Klansmitglied beschuldigt, James Coyle, Führer der großen katholischen St. Pauli-Kirchengemeinde in Birmingham, erschossen zu haben. Der vorsitzende Richter sowie mehrere Mitglieder der Jury waren ebenfalls Klansmitglieder. Es wurde berichtet, dass Black die Zeugen der Staatsanwaltschaft mit der Frage vernommen habe, ob sie katholisch wären, um so ihre Reputation vor der durch den Klan dominierten Jury anzuzweifeln. Die Jury befand Stephenson schließlich für nicht schuldig.

Black trat 1923 dem Robert E. Lee Klan No. 1, einem Zweig des Ku-Klux-Klans in Birmingham, bei. Black hat selbst später angegeben, dem Klan nur bis 1925 anzugehören und während dieser Zeit nicht mehr als vier Versammlungen besucht zu haben. Dem steht gegenüber, dass Black 1926 die Klansversammlung auf Bundesstaatsebene nicht nur besuchte, sondern auch die Versammelten in einer Ansprache adressierte. Die veröffentlichte Version des Hugo Black Symposium berichtet, dass einige, die Black persönlich kannten, zusätzliche Gründe für seine Klanmitgliedschaft bereitstellten. Herman Beck, ein bekannter jüdischer Kaufmann in Birmingham, habe Black zum Beitritt animiert, um das „konfliktschürende Element einzudämmen“ (engl. "contain the trouble-making element"). Black verließ den Klan später im selben Jahr und entzog der Organisation seine Unterstützung.

Karriere im Senat

Nachdem Oscar Underwood in den Ruhestand ging, kandidierte Black 1926 für einen der beiden Sitze Alabamas im Senat der Vereinigten Staaten. Als Mitglied der Demokratischen Partei besiegte Black seinen unterlegenen republikanischen Gegenkandidaten E. H. Dryer mit 80.9 % der Stimmen. Er wurde 1932 mit 86.3 % der Stimmen wiedergewählt.

Senator Black war als hartnäckiger und gewissenhafter Volksvertreter bekannt. 1934 war er Vorsitzender eines Ausschusses, der zur Überprüfung der Vertragsvergabe an Luftpostzusteller eingesetzt wurde, und deckte dabei ein vom Postministerium unterstütztes Kartell auf. Um solche Wettbewerbsmanipulationen in Zukunft zu verhindern, schlug er die Black-McKellar-Bill vor, welche später vom Kongress als Air Mail Act of 1934 verabschiedet wurde. Im mächsten Jahr nahm er an Untersuchungen eines Ausschusses in die Arbeitsweise des Washingtoner Lobbyismus teil und stellte seine Unterstützung hinter eine Gesetzesvorlage, die die Veröffentlichung der Namen und Gehälter aller Lobbyisten verlangte.

1935 wurde Black Vorsitzender des Ausschusses für Bildung und Arbeit, ein Amt, dass er für den Rest seiner Amtszeit im Senat ausübte. Er beteiligte sich 1937 an der Black-Connery-Bill, die die Einführung eines bundesweiten Mindestlohns und eine Beschränkung der wöchentlichen Arbeitszeit auf 40 Stunden vorsah. Obwohl der Gesetzesentwurf zuerst scheiterte, wurde eine abgeschwächte Version 1938 als Fair Labor Standards Act verabschiedet, nachdem Black den Senat bereits verlassen hatte.

Black war ein begeisterter Anhänger Präsident Roosevelts und des New Deals. Insbesondere setzte er sich für die Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937 ein, ein Gesetzesentwurf, der die personelle Vergrößerung des Obersten Gerichtshofs vorsah. Damit sollte es Präsident Roosevelt ermöglicht werden, zusätzliche ihm wohlgesonnene Richter zu ernennen.

Karriere am Obersten Gerichtshof

Nachdem der Plan scheiterte, Präsident Roosevelt neue Möglichkeiten zu geben, Richter zum Obersten Gerichtshof zu ernennen, eröffnete sich eine alternative Lösung, als Richter Willis Van Devanter in den Ruhestand ging. Roosevelt ernannte Black am 12. August 1937 zum Nachfolger Van Devanters. Im Senat bestand bis dahin die Tradition, dass bei Senatoren, die zu einem Amt in der Exekutive oder Judikative ernannt werden, keine weiteren Debatten stattfinden und sie sofort bestätigt werden. Im Falle Blacks brach der Senat aber zum ersten Mal seit 1888 mit dieser Tradition: statt ihn sofort zu bestätigen, wurde die Nominierung an den Justizausschuss des Senats zur Prüfung verwiesen.

Der republikanische Senator Warren Austin, Mitglied des Justizausschusses, lehnte die Nomierung Blacks aus verfassungsrechtlichen Gründen ab. Die Verfassung der Vereinigten Staaten bestimmte im ersten Artikel:

„Kein Senator oder Abgeordneter darf während der Zeit, für die er gewählt wurde, in irgendeine Beamtenstellung im Dienste der Vereinigten Staaten berufen werden, die während dieser Zeit geschaffen oder mit erhöhten Bezügen ausgestattet wurde“

Senatoren und Mitglieder des Repräsentantenhauses ist es also verwehrt, während ihrer Amtszeit von ihrem Posten zurückzutreten, um ein neugeschaffenes oder besserbezahltes politische Amt anzunehmen. Sie müssen vielmehr auf das Ende ihrer Amtszeit als Volksvertreter warten. Senator Austin vertritt die Position, dass Black aufgrund der gerade beschlossenen Erhöhung des Ruhestandsgeldes für Richter am Obersten Gerichtshofs verfassungsrechtlich nicht für einen solchen Posten in Frage kommt. Blacks Unterstützer hielten dem entgegen, dass das Ruhestandsgeld erst ab einem Alter von 70 Jahren ausgezahlt und damit erst 19 Jahre nach dem Ende seiner Amtszeit im Senat bedeutend würde. Schließlich konnten Senator Austins Argumente widerlegt werden und der Ausschuss empfohl am 16. August die Bestätigung Blacks als Richter mit 13 zu 4 Stimmen.

Am nächsten Tag befasste sich der gesamte Senat mit Blacks Nominierung. Gerüchte um Blacks Beteiligung im Ku-Klux-Klan traten an die Oberfläche. Diese veranlasste die demokratischen Senatoren Royal S. Copeland und Edward R. Burke dazu, den Senat zur Ablehnung Blacks aufzufordern. Zu dem Zeitpunkt waren allerdings keine eindeutigen Beweise erhältlich, die Blacks Beziehung zum Klan hätten belegen können. Entsprechend stimmte der Senat nach sechs Stunden Debatte 63 zu 13 für Blacks Bestätigung. Black trat von seinem Amt als Senator zurück und legte drei Tage später seinen Amtseid als Richter des Obersten Gerichtshofs ab. Der Governor von Alabam, Bibb Graves, ernannte seine Frau, um Blacks Sitz im Senat zu übernehmen.

Einen Monat nach der Ernennung Blacks untersuchte die Pittsburgh Post-Gazette seine Vergangenheit im Ku-Klux-Klan. Ray Springle wurde für seine Enthüllungsarbeit zu diesem Thema der Pulitzer-Preis verliehen. Black übermittelte daraufhin via Radio eine Ansprache, in der er sich zu seinem Beitritt und nachfolgenden Austritt aus dem Klan äußerte. Auch wenn seine Reputation zum Zeitpunkt der Ansprache gerade innerhalb der afroamerikanischen Bevölkerung stark angeschlagen wurde, so entwickelte er über die Jahre auch innerhalb dieser Gesellschaftsgruppe hohes Ansehen. So entschied er im wichtigen Kriminalfall Chambers v. Florida 1940 für die afroamerikanischen Angeklagten, die vorher unter Druck falsche Geständnisse für den Mord an einem weißen Amerikaner in Florida abgaben.

Während seiner ersten Jahre am Obersten Gerichtshof half Black dabei, mehrere vorherige Urteile wieder aufzuheben, die die Verfassung äußerst eng auszulegen. Viele Gesetzesinitiativen des New Deals, die nach alten Präzedenzfällen als verfassungswidrig eingestuft worden wären, wurden daher aufrecht erhalten. 1939 ernannte Roosevelt mit Felix Frankfurter und William O. Douglas zwei weitere Richter. Douglas schloss sich in vielen Fällen der Argumentation Blacks, insbesondere, wenn es um Fälle zum 1. Zusatzartikel zur Verfassung ging. Frankfurter entwickelte sich schnell zu einem von Blacks ideologischen Gegnern auf der Richterbank.

In den 1940ern beteiligte sich Richter Black in Folge der Entscheidung im Fall Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, United Mine Workers (1945) an einem langwährenden Streit mit Richter Robert H. Jackson. In diesem Fall entschied der Gerichtshof 5:4 für die Gewerkschaft (United Mine Workers), Black stimmte für die Mehrheit, Jackson dagegen. Allerdings beantragte das Unternehmen eine erneute Verhandlung vor dem Gerichtshof mit der Begründung, dass Richter Black wegen Befangenheit nicht an dem Fall beteiligt sein durfte. Die Befangenheit ergäbe sich, weil Blacks Kanzleipartner 20 Jahre früher schon die Bergwerksarbeiter vertreten hatte. Die Geschäftsordnung des Gerichtshof sieht dabei vor, dass jeder Richter selbst über seine Befangenheit entscheiden muss.

Jackson stimmte zwar mit den anderen Richtern überein, dass der Antrag abgelehnt werden sollte, weigerte sich aber, Blacks Beteiligung im Fall „blind und ohne Einschränkungen“ (engl. "blind and unqualified") zu unterstützen. Als das Gericht schließlich entschied, den Antrag abzulehnen, veröffentlichte Jackson zusammen mit Frankfurter eine Nebenaussage, dass die Ablehnung nicht auf der Nicht-Befangenheit Blacks basierte, sondern auf dem Grundsatz, dass darüber jeder Richter selbst befinden muss.

At first the case attracted little public comment, however, after Chief Justice Harlan Stone died in 1946, rumors that President Harry S. Truman would appoint Jackson as Stone's successor led several newspapers to investigate and report the Jewell Ridge controversy. Truman ultimately chose Fred M. Vinson for the position.

Vinson's tenure as Chief Justice coincided with the Red Scare, a period of intense anti-communism in the United States. In several cases the Supreme Court considered, and upheld, the validity of anticommunist laws passed during this era. For example, in American Communications Association v. Douds (1950), the Court upheld a law that required labor union officials to forswear membership in the Communist Party. Black dissented, claiming that the law violated the First Amendment's free speech clause. Similarly, in Dennis v. United States (1951), the Court upheld the Smith Act, which made it a crime to "advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing the Government of the United States." The law was often used to prosecute individuals for joining the Communist Party. Black again dissented, writing:

"Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest the conviction of these Communist petitioners. There is hope, however, that, in calmer times, when present pressures, passions and fears subside, this or some later Court will restore the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where they belong in a free society."

Beginning in the late 1940s, Black wrote for the Court in several cases relating to the establishment clause, where it had historically insisted on the strict separation of church and state. The most notable of these was Engel v. Vitale (1962), which declared state-sanctioned prayer in public schools unconstitutional. This provoked considerable opposition, especially in the South. Some members of Congress even attempted to restore school prayer by constitutional amendment, efforts which have continued to the present day.

In 1953 Vinson died and was replaced by Earl Warren. Black was often regarded as a member of the liberal wing of the Court, together with Warren, Douglas, William Brennan, and Arthur Goldberg. Yet while he often voted with them on the Warren Court, he occasionally took his own line on some key cases, most notably Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), which established that the Constitution protected a right to privacy. Black's most prominent ideological opponent on the Warren Court was John Marshall Harlan II, who replaced Justice Jackson in 1955. Black and Harlan disagreed on several issues, including the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the states, the scope of the due process clause, and the one man, one vote principle. (For more details, see Jurisprudence below.)

Jurisprudence

Hugo Black is often described as a "textualist" or "strict constructionist."

Black was noted for his advocacy of a textualist approach to constitutional interpretation. He took a "literal" or absolutist reading of the provisions of the Bill of Rights and believed that the text of the Constitution is absolutely determinative on any question calling for judicial interpretation, leading to his reputation as a "textualist" and as a "strict constructionist".

Thus, Black refused to join in the efforts of the justices on the Court who sought to abolish capital punishment in the United States, whose efforts succeeded (temporarily) in the term immediately following Black's death. He claimed that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's reference to takings of "life" meant approval of the death penalty was implicit in the Bill of Rights. He also was not persuaded that a right of privacy was implicit in the Ninth or Fourteenth amendments, and dissented from the Court's 1965 Griswold decision which invalidated a conviction for the sale of contraceptives.

Justice Black rejected reliance on what he called the "mysterious and uncertain" concept of natural law. According to Black that theory was vague and arbitrary, and merely allowed judges to impose their personal views on the nation. Instead, he argued that courts should limit themselves to a strict analysis of the actual text of the Constitution. Black was, in addition, an opponent of the "living constitution" theory. In his dissent to Griswold (1965), he wrote:

I realize that many good and able men have eloquently spoken and written, sometimes in rhapsodical strains, about the duty of this Court to keep the Constitution in tune with the times. The idea is that the Constitution must be changed from time to time, and that this Court is charged with a duty to make those changes. For myself, I must, with all deference, reject that philosophy. The Constitution makers knew the need for change, and provided for it. Amendments suggested by the people's elected representatives can be submitted to the people or their selected agents for ratification. That method of change was good for our Fathers, and, being somewhat old-fashioned, I must add it is good enough for me.

Thus, some have characterized Black as an originalist.

Federalism

Like the other Justices appointed by President Roosevelt, Black held an expansive view of federal power, especially under the commerce clause. Previously, during the 1920s and 1930s, the Court had interpreted this clause narrowly, often striking down laws on the grounds that Congress had overstepped its authority. After 1937, however, the Supreme Court overturned several precedents and affirmed a broader interpretation of the commerce clause. Black consistently voted with the majority in these decisions; for example, he joined United States v. Darby Lumber Co. (1941), Wickard v. Filburn (1942), Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung (1964).

In several other federalism cases, however, Black ruled against the federal government. For instance, he partially dissented from South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966), in which the Court upheld the validity of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In an attempt to protect the voting rights of African Americans, the act required any state whose population was at least 5% African American to obtain federal approval before changing its voting laws. Black wrote that the law,

... by providing that some of the States cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional amendments without first being compelled to beg federal authorities to approve their policies, so distorts our constitutional structure of government as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution between state and federal power almost meaningless.

Similarly, in Oregon v. Mitchell (1970), he delivered the opinion of the court holding that the federal government was not entitled to set the voting age for state elections.

In the law of federal jurisdiction, Black made a large contribution by authoring the majority opinion in Younger v. Harris. This case, decided during Black's last year on the Court, has given rise to what is now known as Younger abstention. According to this doctrine, an important principle of federalism called "comity"—that is, respect by federal courts for state courts—dictates that federal courts abstain from intervening in ongoing state proceedings, absent the most compelling circumstances. The case is also famous for its discussion of what Black calls "Our Federalism," a discussion in which Black expatiates on

proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.

Civil Rights

During his tenure on the bench, Black established a record sympathetic to the civil rights movement. He joined the majority in Shelley v. Kramer (1948), which invalidated the judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants. Similarly, he was part of the unanimous Brown v. Board of Education (1954) Court that struck down racial segregation in public schools. He was burnt in effigy by segregationists back in Alabama.

However, he also wrote the court's majority opinion in Korematsu v. United States, which validated Roosevelt's decision to intern Japanese Americans on the West Coast during World War II, a decision roundly criticized today. He stated that, while race-based internment was "constitutionally suspect", it was permissible during "circumstances of direst emergency and peril." In dissent Justice Frank Murphy accused the government of "fall[ing] into the ugly abyss of racism."

First Amendment

Black took an absolutist approach to First Amendment jurisprudence, as reflected by his famous aphorism, "No law means no law." As a result he often found himself in dissent, although he was usually joined by Justice William O. Douglas. However, his interpretation of the establishment clause was (for the most part) shared by his colleagues, especially during the tenure of Chief Justice Warren.

Black took a dim view of government entanglement with religion. He believed that the First Amendment erected a "wall of separation" between church and state. During his career Black wrote several important opinions relating to church-state separation. He delivered the opinion of the court in Everson v. Board of Education (1947), which held that the establishment clause was applicable not only to the federal government, but also to the states. His majority opinion in McCollum v. Board of Education (1948) held that the government could not provide religious instruction in public schools. In Torasco v. Watkins (1961), he delivered an opinion which affirmed that the states could not use religious tests as qualifications for public office. Similarly, he authored the majority opinion in Engel v. Vitale (1962), which declared it unconstitutional for states to require the recitation of official prayers in public schools.

Justice Black is often regarded as a leading defender of First Amendment rights such as the freedom of speech and of the press. He refused to accept the doctrine that the freedom of speech could be curtailed on national security grounds. Thus, in New York Times Co. v. United States (1971), he voted to allow newspapers to publish the Pentagon Papers despite the Nixon Administration's contention that publication would have security implications. In his concurring opinion, Black stated, "The word 'security' is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." He rejected the idea that the government was entitled to punish "obscene" speech. Likewise, he argued that defamation laws abridged the freedom of speech and were therefore unconstitutional. Most members of the Supreme Court rejected both of these views. However, Black's interpretation did attract the support of Justice Douglas.

However he did not believe that individuals had the right to speak wherever they pleased. He delivered the majority opinion in Adderley v. Florida (1966), controversially upholding a trespassing conviction for protestors who demonstrated on government property. He also dissented from Tinker v. Des Moines (1969), in which the Supreme Court ruled that students had the right to wear armbands (as a form of protest) in schools, writing,

While I have always believed that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments neither the State nor the Federal Government has any authority to regulate or censor the content of speech, I have never believed that any person has a right to give speeches or engage in demonstrations where he pleases and when he pleases.

Moreover, Black took a narrow view of what constituted "speech" under the First Amendment. For example, he did not believe that flag burning was speech; in Street v. New York (1969), he wrote: "It passes my belief that anything in the Federal Constitution bars a State from making the deliberate burning of the American flag an offense." Similarly, he dissented from Cohen v. California (1971), in which the Court held that wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words "Fuck the Draft" was speech protected by the First Amendment. He agreed that this activity "was mainly conduct, and little speech."

Criminal procedure

Black adopted a narrower interpretation of the Fourth Amendment than many of his colleagues on the Warren Court. He dissented from Katz v. United States (1967), in which the Court held that warrantless wiretapping violated the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. However, he argued that the Fourth Amendment only protected tangible items from physical searches or seizures. Thus, he concluded that telephone conversations were not within the scope of the amendment, and that warrantless wiretapping was consequently permissible.

Justice Black originally believed that the Constitution did not require the exclusion of illegally seized evidence at trials. In his concurrence to Wolf v. Colorado (1949), he claimed that the exclusionary rule was "not a command of the Fourth Amendment but ... a judicially created rule of evidence." But he later changed his mind and joined the majority in Mapp v. Ohio (1961), which applied it to state as well as federal criminal investigations. In his concurrence, he indicated that his support was based on the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of the right against self-incrimination, not on the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. He wrote, "I am still not persuaded that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, would be enough to bar the introduction into evidence ... seized ... in violation of its commands."

In other instances Black took a fairly broad view of the rights of criminal defendants. He joined the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), which required law enforcement officers to warn suspects of their rights prior to interrogations, and consistently voted to apply the guarantees of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments at the state level.

Incorporation

One of the most notable aspects of Justice Black's jurisprudence was the view that the entirety of the federal Bill of Rights was applicable to the states. Originally, the Bill of Rights was binding only upon the federal government, as the Supreme Court ruled in Barron v. Baltimore (1833). According to Black the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, "incorporated" the Bill of Rights, or made it binding upon the states as well. In particular, he pointed to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." He proposed that the term "privileges or immunities" encompassed the rights mentioned in the first eight amendments to the Constitution.

Black first expounded this theory of incorporation when the Supreme Court ruled in Adamson v. California (1947) that the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination did not apply to the states. In an appendix to his dissenting opinion, Justice Black analyzed statements made by those who framed the Fourteenth Amendment, reaching the conclusion that "the Fourteenth Amendment, and particularly its privileges and immunities clause, was a plain application of the Bill of Rights to the states."

This theory sparked an extended debate within the Court and the academic legal community. It attracted the support of Justices such as Frank Murphy and William O. Douglas. However, it never achieved the support of a majority of the Court. The most prominent opponents of Black's theory were Justices Felix Frankfurter and John Marshall Harlan II. Frankfurter and Harlan argued that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Bill of Rights per se, but merely protected rights that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."

The Supreme Court never accepted the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the entirety of the Bill of Rights. However, it did agree that some "fundamental" guarantees were made applicable to the states. For the most part, during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, only First Amendment rights (such as free exercise of religion and freedom of speech) were deemed sufficiently fundamental by the Supreme Court to be incorporated.

However, during the 1960s the Court under Chief Justice Warren took the process much further, making almost all guarantees of the Bill of Rights binding upon the states. Thus, although the Court failed to accept Black's theory of total incorporation, the end result of its jurisprudence is very close to what Black advocated. Today, the only parts of the first eight amendments that have not been extended to the states are the Second, Third and Seventh amendments and the grand jury clause of the Fifth.

Due process clause

Justice Black was well-known for his rejection of the doctrine of substantive due process. Most Supreme Court Justices accepted the view that the due process clause encompassed not only procedural guarantees, but also "fundamental fairness" and fundamental rights. Thus, it was argued that due process included a "procedural" component as well as a "substantive component."

Black, however, believed that this interpretation of the due process clause was unjustifiably broad. In his dissent to Griswold, he charged that the doctrine of substantive due process "takes away from Congress and States the power to make laws based on their own judgment of fairness and wisdom, and transfers that power to this Court for ultimate determination." Instead, Black advocated a much narrower interpretation of the clause. In his dissent to In Re Winship, he analyzed the history of the term "due process of law", and concluded: "For me, the only correct meaning of that phrase is that our Government must proceed according to the 'law of the land'—that is, according to written constitutional and statutory provisions as interpreted by court decisions."

None of Black's colleagues shared this interpretation of the due process clause. Harlan in particular was highly critical of it, indicating his "continued bafflement at my Brother Black's insistence that due process ... does not embody a concept of fundamental fairness" in his Winship concurrence. Since Black's death the Court has continued to apply the doctrine of substantive due process (most notably in Roe v. Wade, which proclaimed that abortion was a constitutionally protected right).

Voting rights

Black was one of the Supreme Court's foremost defenders of the "one man, one vote" principle. He delivered the opinion of the court in Wesberry v. Sanders (1964), holding that the Constitution required congressional districts in any state to be approximately equal in population. He concluded that the Constitution's command "that Representatives be chosen 'by the People of the several States' means that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." Likewise, he voted in favor of Reynolds v. Sims (1965), which extended the same requirement to state legislative districts on the basis of the equal protection clause.

At the same time, Black did not believe that the equal protection clause made poll taxes unconstitutional. Thus, he dissented from the Court's ruling in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections (1966) invalidating the use of the poll tax as a qualification to vote. He criticized the Court for exceeding its "limited power to interpret the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause" and for "giving that clause a new meaning which it believes represents a better governmental policy."

Resignation and death

Justice Black admitted himself to the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland, on August 28, 1971, and subsequently resigned from the Court on September 17. He suffered a stroke two days later and died on September 25. He was buried at the Arlington National Cemetery. Black had served on the Supreme Court for thirty-four years, making him the fourth longest-serving Justice in Supreme Court history.

President Richard Nixon first considered nominating Hershel Friday to fill the vacant seat, but changed his mind after the American Bar Association found Friday unqualified. Nixon then nominated Lewis Powell, who was confirmed by the Senate.

In 1986 Black appeared on a postage stamp issued by the United States Postal Service. He is one of only three Associate Justices to do so; the other two are Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall. In 1987, Congress passed a law designating the new courthouse building for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama in Birmingham, Alabama, as the "Hugo L. Black United States Courthouse".

Literatur

• Howard Ball: Of Power and Right : Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, and America's Constitutional Revolution. Oxford University Press, New York 1992, ISBN 0-19-504612-9.
• Howard Ball: Hugo L. Black: Cold Steel Warrior. Oxford University Press, New York 1996, ISBN 0-19-507814-4.
• Hugo Black, Jr: My Father: A Remembrance. Random House, New York 1975, ISBN 0-394-49631-0.
• Hugo LaFayette Black: Mr. Justice and Mrs. Black: The Memoirs of Hugo L. Black and Elizabeth Black. Random House, New York 1986.
• Gerald T. Dunne: Hugo Black and the Judicial Revolution. Simon Schuster, New York 1977, ISBN 0-671-22341-0.
• John Paul Frank: Mr. Justice Black, the Man and His Opinions. Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1949.
• Tony Allen Freyer: Hugo L. Black and the Dilemma of American Liberalism. Scott, Foresman, Glenview, Illinois 1990, ISBN 0-673-39951-6.
• Roger K. Newman: Hugo Black: A Biography. Pantheon Books, New York 1994, ISBN 0-679-43180-2.
• James F. Simon: The Antagonists: Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Civil Liberties in America. Simon Schuster, New York 1989 0-671-47797-8.
• Steve Suitts: Hugo Black of Alabama. New South Books, Montgomery, AL 2005, ISBN 1-588-38144-7.
• Tinsley E. Yarbrough: Mr. Justice Black and His Critics. Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina 1989, ISBN 0-271-00636-6.

Weblinks

• "Black, Hugo Lafayette." Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. (engl.)
• Goldman, Jeremy. "Hugo L. Black." Oyez Project. (engl.)
• Supreme Court Historical Society. "Hugo L. Black." (engl.)

en:Hugo Black he:הוגו לפאייט בלאק uk:Блек Г'юго