Diskussion:Morgenthau-Plan/Archiv/2007

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[[Diskussion:Morgenthau-Plan/Archiv/2007#Thema 1]]

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was fehlt

Der Morgenthau-Plan wäre in abgeschwächter Form nicht nur nachteilig gewesen. Dies fehlt im Artikel. Auch hätte auch erwähnt werden sollen, warum er u.a. nicht umgesetzt wurde. Dazu gehört nicht nur der Kalte Krieg, sondern auch die Tatsache, daß z.B. die USA aus einem Agrarstaat keine Profite hätten rausziehen können. --Zündkerze 06:26, 27. Jan. 2007 (CET)

Das ist Theoriefindung. Meine persönliche Ansicht ist eine andere, aber auch das tut nichts zur Sache. --Thomas Maierhofer 11:00, 14. Jun. 2007 (CEST)

Weiteres zu JCS 1067 usw.

Betr. „Im September 1944 wurde der Plan fallen gelassen, ohne dass sich die zuständigen Gremien damit befasst hatten.... Der Plan wurde, da bereits 1944 nicht weiterverfolgt, im Nachkriegsdeutschland nicht umgesetzt.“

Das stammt auch von Benz und ist, wie die angeblichen „agrarromantischer Ideen“ im Morgenthau-Plan selbst, etwas märchenhaft. Morgenthau blieb weiter einflussreich und seine Ideen fanden anderen Ausdruck, hauptsächlich im JCS 1067 (der zwischen Mai 1945 und Juli 1947 in Kraft blieb) und im Potsdamer Abkommen. Zu JCS 1067 hat Morgenthau selbst gemeint, er hoffe „someone doesn't recognize it as the Morgenthau Plan.“ („dass uns nur keiner merkt dass das der Morgenthau-Plan ist“) (Michael R. Beschloss, The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941–1945, pg. 233, zitiert im Englischen „Morgenthau-Plan“ Wiki). Wie dass geschickt in dem vorliegenden Wiki.de Artikel einzuarbeiten sei, fällt mir im Augenblick nicht ein, aber dass eine Korrigierung hier nötig ist, ist mir klar.

Von JCS 1067 (April 1945) bis JCS 1779 (Juli 1947) vergingen immerhin über 2 Jahre. Der Abschnitt "tatsächlichens Vorgehen" kann so nicht bleiben. Der Marschall Plan trat erst danach in Kraft. Das wird unter anderem auch von dem umstrittenen Author James Bacque in "verschwiegene Schuld" aufgegriffen, dessen Thesen allerdings auch nicht so übernommen werden können, da insbesondere *die Methoden zur Erhebung seiner Statistiken angezweifelt wurden.--Thomas Maierhofer 10:54, 14. Jun. 2007 (CEST)

This is a highly inaccurate Article

I'm surprised that such an article is allowed in German Wikipedia, whatever literary sources this article uses they seem to be quite incompetent. I guess the authors of those sources suffer from an inability to read English language primary and secondary literature.

Some examples to make my point:

• 1

There were ca 140 high ranking "Morgenthau boys", as they were nicknamed by OMGUS, in the occupation forces in Germany 1945 - 1947. They were officials from Morgenthau's Treasury that had been "loaned in" to the army of occupation by General Eisenhower. They were working very hard to promote the Morgenthau plan and to interpret the occupation directive JCS 1067 as harshly as possible. Why is there no mention of the Morgenthau boys in this article?

• 2

Morgenthau wrote and published the book "Germany is our problem". In it he describes the Morgenthau plan in great detail. In 1945 1000 copies of this book were distributed amongst U.S. officers in Germany. Why does this article not mention "Germany is our problem"?

• 3

As for the article mentioning the Marshal plan which provided Germany with a total of $1.4 Billion in loans 1948 - 1952. If you are going to mention the Marshal plan you should also mention the money Germany simultaneously had to pay the Allies for the costs of occupation, $2.4 billion per year. [1]. Or why not also mention the $10.0 Billion worth of patents and industrial knowledge that the U.S. stole from German companies in 1945 - 1947. John Gimbel "Science Technology and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany". p.152. The British did some stealing as well:[2]. And the French.... best not mention the French...

• 4

I suggest you read some proper literature on the MP topic, such as en:Morgenthau_Plan#Further_reading or articles such as en:The_industrial_plans_for_Germany.

• 5

One of the initial MP proposals, containing provisions for slave labor and territorial annexations. [3] (Germany later suffered annexation of 25% of her territory, and 4 million Germans were still doing slave labor in 1947, roughly 1 million in the UK and France) Eugene Davidson, The Death and Life of Germany, p. 166 ans see also [4]

• 6

The MP memorandum agreed upon and signed by President Roosevelt and Churchill in Quebec in September 1944: [5] (select pages. 466–467)

• 7

Roosevelt later stepped back from but never completely abandoned the Morgenthau plan, he just publicly pretended it didn’t exist.: [6], [7].

• 8

Some facts from Gareau: The Morgenthau plan for "industrial disarmament" of Germany was promoted by the U.S. at the Potsdam conference (August 1945), and in the following meetings of the Allied Control Council. Despite strong British objections the U.S. and the other Allies managed to push through a general reduction of German industries of 50 - 55% of German 1938 levels. Most of this reduction would take place in Chemical, machine, and metal industries which would be reduced far below that figure. Production was restricted in accordance with the agreement, but dismantling and destruction of German factories in the west was partly halted in May 1946. U.S. policy changed with the Stuttgart speech in September 1946, but dismantling was nevertheless resumed in June 1948. The temporary stop was due to disagreements between the Allies. Dismantling of German heavy industry finally industry ended in 1951 when West Germany agreed to Join the European Coal and Steel Community. By then 706 factories had been dismantled in the West. One of the industries hardest hit, the German steel industy, had been reduced in production capacity by 6,700,000 tons per year. The policy of industrial disarmament continued in diluted form, mainly in production and capacity restrictions of key industries, but were gradually relaxed and removed. The last industrial restriction was removed in May 5 1955. "The last act of the Morgenthau drama occurred on that date or when the Saar was returned to Germany". (Gareau p.530) Frederick H. Gareau "Morgenthau's Plan for Industrial Disarmament in Germany" The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Jun., 1961), pp. 517–534 [8]

• 9

The first "level of industry" plan, signed by the Allies in March 29, 1946, stated that German heavy industry was to be lowered to 50% of its 1938 levels by the destruction of 1,500 listed manufacturing plants.

• 10

In January 1946 the Allied Control Council set the foundation of the future German economy by putting a cap on German steel production—the maximum allowed was set at about 5,800,000 tons of steel a year, equivalent to 25% of the prewar production level. [9], [10], [11]

• 11

The United States stopped actively promoting the Morgenthau plan in September 1946, when those policies were renounced in the 6 September 1946 Stuttgard speech by James Byrnes, U.S. secretary of state. [12]

• 12

From an interview: [13] "As early as the Quebec Conference he (President Roosevelt) had bought Secretary [Henry J.] Morgenthau's ideas: "The Morgenthau Plan -- to do everything possible to prevent the Germans from regaining the strength ever again to wage war, by requiring them to exist on an agrarian economy. Then gradually the President pulled back from that extreme position. Yet those ideas permeated much of American thinking, especially in the War Department, right up to the time of Secretary [James F.] Byrnes' important Stuttgart speech in 1946. They were reflected in the basic directive for the occupation of Germany, which was a kind of Bible for all that was done during the early days of the occupation, the paper known as JSC-1067. They also affected Roosevelt's[47] thinking on the question of whether to split up Germany.

"MCKINZIE: You look at the period between the Morgenthau plan and the Marshall plan, one of which represents a "salted earth" policy, and the other an industrial [84] development policy. The question of historians who are always concerned with pinning things down to precise things inevitably comes down to: what was the turning point? Was there any particular event or any absolutely crucial time period in which the change from the Morgenthau plan to the direction of the Marshall plan was made?

LIGHTNER: I think it was fairly gradual. I think the military had their directives based, as I said before, very much on the philosophy of the Morgenthau plan, the basic JCS-l067."

• 13

In the spring of 1947 former U.S. President Herbert Hoover pointed out that: 1. The Morgenthau policy that had been agreed upon at Quebec was still partly being followed, German industry was being destroyed of stopped from working at full capacity. [14] 2. If the current Morgenthau plan policies were continued, 25 million Germans would have to be "removed", in one way or another....[15]

• 14

By July 1947 it was realized that by shutting down the German economy the economy of the rest of Europe had also been harmed. Therefore the U.S. military occupation directive JCS 1067 was stopped and replaced by a friendlier directive.... JCS 1067 had directed the U.S. forces in Germany to "take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany [or] designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy". [16]

• 15

The occupation directive JCS 1067 was in effect the Morgenthau plan. When President Truman signed it in May 10, 1945 Morgenthau said it was a victory for his Treasury department, and that he hoped that no-one recognized it as the Morgenthau plan.... Michael R. Beschloss, "The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany", 1941–1945, pg. 233.

• 16

Dismantling of the German industry, which had been agreed upon by the Allies at the Potsdam conference where the U.S. was following the Morgenthau plan, continued until 1951. [17], [18], [19]

• 17

On 30 October 1949 the British foreign minister Bevin wrote a letter to his French colleague Shuman, telling him that the protests by German workers were now so frequent that the Germans might manage to stop the Allies dismantling of German industry. Something had to be done do stop the Germans from succeeding. [20]

• 18

In 2006 the UK national archives released notes from a UK government meeting that had taken place 50 years earlier. On the 21 October 1946 the U.K cabinet (senior government officials) had a meeting. [21] Quotes from that meeting, On the August 1945 Potsdam conference, and its outcome:

"b) U.S. policy was pastoralising (Morgenthan) until Stuttgart speech. They supported R. & Fr. case - to point of reducing steel prodn to 5.8 m. tons. And during Loan talks, cdn´t oppose them too strongly." ...."They forced us to 5.8 m."

"Before this was completed I had seen Byrnes (before Stuttgart speech) & asked wtr. this meant he wd. overthrow Morgenthau policy. He said yes - with Truman´s authy."

He refers to the Morgenthau plan for pastoralizing Germany. The Stuttgart speech in September 1946 by Secretary of State James Byrnes, and the reduction of German heavy industry, specifically Steel production from 20 million tonnes a year to 5.8 million tonnes a year.

• 19

The March 1949 words of a famous German politician; Konrad Adenauer: [22] "It also seems that intentions such as had once been manifested in the Morgenthau Plan played their part. This continued until the Marshall Plan brought the turning point. The Marshall Plan will remain for all time a glorious page in the history of the United States of America. But the change was very slow and the economic, physical, moral, and political decline of Germany which had begun with the unconditional surrender took great efforts to reverse." --Stor stark7 04:04, 9. Sep. 2007 (CEST)

Dear friend from Sweden, I also think that this article is biased, but not in the way you intend to tell us.

Also weiter auf Deutsch: Der Artikel ist wirklich etwas einseitig und suggeriert, dass der Morgenthau-Plan die Vernichtung der Deutschen durch eine gewollte Hungerkatastrophe zur Folge gehabt hätte. Das ist doch bitte hochgradig übertrieben. Vielleicht wollten die USA ja nur einen fixen Absatzmarkt für ihre Getreideüberproduktion. Das mit 30 Millionen möglichen Toten ist wirklich komplett lächerlich. Und überhaupt, was ist so schlimm an der Idee von einem Agrarland? Franklin D. Roosevelt, unter dessen Patronanz der Plan hauptsächlich stand, war ja eher als sozialer Politiker bekannt und hat schon in der Wirtschaftskrise Suppenküchen und gratis Lebensmittelversorgung für die Armen und Arbeitslosen organisiert. Auch wenn korrekt zitiert wurde sind Aussage wie: "Den Hungertod vieler Millionen Deutscher wollte Morgenthau in Kauf nehmen" ... einfach Blödsinn. Ich erinnere nur einmal an die Millionen CARE-Pakete, die aus den USA ins Nachkriegsdeutschland geschickt wurden. Ich schlage deshalb eine Verbesserung des Artikels vor um ihn etwas ausgewogener zu gestalten, so bekommt jeder Leser wirklich den falschen Eindruck. --El bes 16:49, 7. Nov. 2007 (CET)

El Bes - Bist du dir sicher dass du den Ablauf wirklich kennst? Wenn du von CARE Paketen sprichst so ist das der Marshall Plan. Diese Doktrin wurde erst mit Direktive JCS 1779 im Juli 1947 eingeführt. bis dahin galt die Doktrin JCS 1067 (vom Mai 1945). Sclussendlich geht es genau um diesen Zeitraum. Innerhalb dieser gut 2 Jahre ware Deutschland vom Hilfsprogramm CARE ausgeschlossen. Deine weiteren Spekulationen (die USA wollte vielleicht) sind Theoriefindung. Nach der Doktrin JCS 1067 ist Deutschland ein besetztes Feindesland. In diesen 2 Jahren hat insbesondere die USA sämtliche völkerrechtlichen Konventionen gebrochen. Z.B. aus den deutschen Kriegsgefangenen wurden DEFs (Disarmed Enimy Forces), die Bedingungen in den amerikanischen Lagern waren Katastrophal (siehe Rheinwiesenlager). Die deutschen Kriegsgefangen wurden unter Verletzung der Genfer Konvention zum Minenräumen in Frankreich eingesetzt. usw. usw. Die historischen Tatsachen und der Artikel sind hier noch weit voneinander entfernt. Die Kritik von Stor stark ist deshalb in Teilen sicherlich nicht unberechtigt und der Artikel müsste in diesem Zusammenahnd die Tatsachen wesentlich schonungsloser darstellen. Insbesondere der Abschnitt Tatsächliches Vorgehen ist der Reine Unsinn, da der Zeitraum bis zur Truman Doktin (immerhin über 2 Jahre) völlig ausgeblendet wurden. Das unter Truman ein Paradigmenwechsel stattfand bestreitet niemand. Was bis dahin Doktrin war und mit JCS 1067 gemeint war kann man z.B. hier nachlesen: Die Entstehung der Bayerischen Verfassung - Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit--Thomas Maierhofer 11:56, 8. Nov. 2007 (CET)

Ich kenn mich im Detail zu wenig mit dem Thema aus um selber Verbesserungen vorzunehmen und werde es deshalb auch nicht machen. Der Morgenthau-Plan bezieht sich aber auf die wirtschaftspolitischen Pläne der USA bezüglich Deutschland und ich glaube nicht, dass man das mit der Behandlung von Kriegsgefangenen vermischen sollte, da dies in der Kompetenz der Armee war. Was ich sicher weiss, ist dass es zu keiner Hungerkatastrophe gekommen ist und die USA eine solche auch nie bewusst herbei führen wollten, obwohl es die Zivilbevölkerung kurz nach Kriegsende natürlich nicht leicht gehabt hat. Interessant dazu wäre auch ein Vergleich zwischen der Versorgungslage in der von den Amerikanern besetzten Zone in Österreich und dem amerikanisch besetzten Teil Deutschlands. So weit ich weiss, sind Ende 1945 und auch 1946 viele Flüchtlinge und Displaced Persons sogar illegal von Österreich über die Grenze nach Bayern gegangen, was die sicher nicht gemacht hätten, wenn dort die Versorgungslage bedeutend schlechter gewesen wäre. --El bes 13:00, 8. Nov. 2007 (CET)

Das ist Unsinn, was du da schreibst. In Deutschland war eine Militärregierung installiert. Die Ernärung der Zivilbevölkerung war Kompetenz der Armee, viellicht liest du dir den Link durch den ich im letzten Post habe. General Lucius D. Clay war Leiter dieser Militärregierung bezüglich des amerikanischen Sektors. Die Ernährung der Zivilbevölkerung war wie die Internierungsbedingung der Kriegsgefangenen Sache dieser Militärregierung. Ich vermische da also gar nichts.

Mein Urgroßvater + Familie kam 1945 als Displaced Person" von Rumänien über Österreich nach Deutschland. Sie hätten in die Sowjetische Besatzungszone gemusst, sind aber illegal über die Grenzen. Das hatte vor allem den Grund dass er 3 Frauen dabei hatte, die vor den russischen Soldaten nicht sicher waren. Vergewaltigung, Mord und Totschlag kam bei den Amerikanern im Gegensatz zu den Russen so gut wie nicht vor. Die Ernährungssituation war sowohl bei den Amerikanern als auch bei den Sowjets katastrophal. Doch vor den "Russen" hatten die Flüchtlinge Angst, und das war der Grund warum Sie versuchten in die Westlichen Zonen zu kommen. Eine Hungersnot herrschte da allerdings auch. Extrem war z.B. Berlin mit einer Sterblichkeit im Jahr 45/46 von 4,6% der Gesamtbevölkerung. ( Auf dem Land hat es viellicht noch funktioniert, in den Größen Städten uberhaupt nicht. Das schlimmste Hungerjahr war 1947. Danach zeigte der Marshallplan Wirkung.

Woher glaubst du also zu Wissen, dass es zu keiner Hungersnot kam? Beleg das mal. Tipp: Google mal nach "Schlechte Zeit Währungsreform". Du wirst dich wundern was du da Findest. Im Volksmund wird die Zeit von 1945-1947 als die "schlechte Zeit" bezeichnet, ab 1948 begann die "Gute Zeit". Oder wie die Alten es sagen: "nach der Währung". Für diesen Artikel stellen sich nur 2 Fragen: Hat das die amerikanische Militärregierung verschuldet? Und wenn ja, kann man das in Verbindung mit dem Morgenthau-Plan bringen. Das haben aber nicht wir Wikipedianer zu klären, sondern Historiker und Publizisten. Wir stellen das hier nur dar. Und momentan ist es ziemlich falsch dargestellt. --Thomas Maierhofer 16:09, 8. Nov. 2007 (CET)

Hab mir gerade den englischen Artikel zum Morgenthau-Plan genau durchgelesen und eigentlich steht da das wichtigste drinnen, ohne Verschweigen aber auch ohne Polemik. Es wird dort auch auf die jüngere Debatte Ende der 80er und Anfang der 90er Jahre in den USA selber eingegangen, was sehr interessant ist. Wenn man nämlich eine statistische Aufrechnung machen will was Sterblichkeit usw. betrifft, dann müsste das sehr sehr gründlich gemacht werden, weil hier viele unterschiedliche Faktoren mitspielen wie zB. dass viele Leute vom Krieg her krank, verwundet oder unterernährt waren und deswegen in den Monaten nach dem Mai 45 gestorben sind. Ausserdem mit welchem Land und welchen Daten willst du das vergleichen um einen Normalwert für die Jahre 45-47 zu erhalten, mit Frankreich, Belgien, oder mit Polen, der Ukraine oder Rumänien? Die Datenerfassung war auch nicht besonders und viele Menschen haben sich aus dem einen oder anderen Grund der Registrierung durch die eine oder andere Behörde entzogen. Und zur Oral History deiner Familie: Sind die VOR der Roten Armee nach Österreich gekommen oder dahinter? Wohin nach Österreich, in die sowjetische Zone, oder in die amerikanische, nach Wien, oder vielleicht in die Steiermark? Das ist nicht unerheblich weil zB die Steiermark zu erst von den Briten besetzt wurde und dann an die Rote Armee übergeben wurde, das hat natürlich einen neuen Flüchtlingsstrom ausgelöst. Nicht unerheblich ist auch die Staatsbürgerschaft der Displaeced Persons gewesen. Siebenbürger Sachsen oder Banater Schwaben mit rumänischer Staatsangehörigkeit sind von den alliierten Behörden natürlich nach Rumänien zurück geschickt worden, nicht nur von den Sowjets. --El bes 17:07, 8. Nov. 2007 (CET)

Der englische Morgenthau Artikel ist in etwa das was ich mir hier vorstelle. Wenn man das einfach nur übersetzen würde, hatte der Artikel sicher gewonnen und die Kritik von Stor stark wäre ausgeräumt. Da ich aber an meinen eigenen Artikeln nicht weiterkomme, werde ich derzeit keine neue Baustelle aufmachen. Ich bin auch kein Experte für die Nachkriegspolitik der USA ind Deutschland. Mein persönlicher Interessenschwerpunkt liegt beim Konzentrationslager Auschwitz Birkenau. Da verfüge ich auch über die entsprechenden Fachbücher. Zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt werde ich es vielleicht angehen. --Thomas Maierhofer 17:46, 8. Nov. 2007 (CET)

The discussion is apparently already over, as far as I with my crappy German can tell. I would nevertheless like to provide my own attempt at an answer to the original post by El bes to the best of my understanding. As I understand it there are two questions.

Question 1. What was Morgenthaus intentions with his plan for the German people,

A: a happy pastoral life,

B: revenge,

C: Simply a removal of German war potential, what the effects would be to the people was of litle intrest.

Question 2. Don't the Care packages mean that the U.S was helping germany, and therefore not implementing the Morgenthau plan?

Question 1

What was Morgenthaus intentions?

There is a theory that Morgenthau just wanted the best for the German people, and that he thought they would be happy as peasants. This theory probably has its basis in Morgenthaus and Roosevelts agricultural roots, but it would be intresting to know if there is any actuall evidence for it.

Did Morgenthau ever actually say that he thought an agricultural life would be positive for the german people?

I found this Morgenthau quote instead: "Why the hell should I care what happens to their people?" [23]

This does of course not prove anything, but to me indicates that the truth is more C than A. --Stor stark7 00:37, 14. Nov. 2007 (CET)

Question 2

Don't the Care packages mean that the U.S was helping Germany, and therefore not implementing the Morgenthau plan?

Not really, just as it is difficult do define exactly what was the morgenthau plan (it changed shape so many times), it is difficult do define how policy changed. the most that can be said is that it was very gradual. From the start the U.S. public was of the opinion that Germany was being completely turned into farmland, see also the last paragraph of en:The President's Economic Mission to Germany and Austria

Care packages to Germany began on July 15, 1946 when the freighter American Ranger arrived in Bremen with 35,000 packages. The packages were sent from individuals in the U.S. to relatives/friends they knew in Germany. After that the program gradually expanded, eventually as general aid and not only as packages posted to individuals.

This much is clear, more than a year after the occupation began, U.S. Care packages began to be sent to individual addresses in Germany.

Lets forget the U.S. for now and instead look at the U.K for a while.

Victor Gollancz was a Jewish humanitarian who wrote a number of books on the allied occupation of Germany. his campaign "Save Europe Now" eventually helped Germany. "Nicht zuletzt sein Engagement führte im Dezember 1946 dazu, dass die britische Regierung das Verbot, Lebensmittelpakete nach Deutschland zu senden, aufhob."

This is interesting, it was illegal for the British people to send food to the German people, but after Gollancz campaign, the prohibition was removed. Germany owes Gollancz a lot of gratitude, so I'm surprised there are almost no articles linking to his article. For those who are interested there is a paper of Gollancz from 1947 on the web (in English of course).

• Victor Gollancz, "Germany Revisited", London Victor Gollancz LTD, 1947

Let us return to the U.S.

There was one relief organization in operation from the start. en:United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration which also operated in Germany from 1945, but was forbidden from helping German refugees.

then there was en:GARIOA which was approved to help Germans in 1946 (I dont know at which date it began operations in Germany, probably late 1946 or early 1947 but I really have no idea).

The best information available is however a paper presented at the conference on Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe, held in Duquesne University in 2000. The papers from that conference were later published in the book by Steven Bela Vardy and T. Hunt Tooley, eds., Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe. Foreword by Otto von Habsburg. Associate editor, Agnes Huszar Vardy. Social Science Monographs, Boulder CO, 2003. ISBN 0-88033-995-0 [24]

I strongly recommend that you in the book read the paper by Richard Dominic Wiggers, The United States and the Refusal to Feed German Civilians after World War II pp. 274 - 288.

The original papers from the conference are also available for download from here: Vardy

Interesting, but not as interesting as the former, is the paper on the German food situation from 1947 by former U.s. president Herbert Hoover: The presidents report nr. 1.

Or if you're in a hurry you could simply check out the rather compressed and cursory "food subchapter" in the article en:Eisenhower and German POWs

So what is my point? U.S. policy regarding food help changed very slowly, just as their general policy regarding the Morgenthau plan changed slowly. I guess I might here have as we say in Sweden "knocked open an already open door", but I hope at least something of my writing was useful to someone, since I wasted over an hour on it. Cheers --Stor stark7 00:37, 14. Nov. 2007 (CET)

Thanks a lot for your sophisticated work, Stor stark7. I also think that the discussion is almost over, but the part "Zur Person Morgenthaus - seine Aufzeichnungen und weitere Stimmen zu seinem Plan" of the article is still unchanged and remains just a listing of contradictory quotations. Also no user would personally come up with such a title for a chapter, this was copied from some unmentioned source.

The reason why I reacted a bit fierce and why I still believe that there was no severe starvation, is that from first hand oral history of a lot of people who spoke to me about the WWII-era and who experienced all this events, they never really mentioned a famine or people starving after May 1945. The food situation was not very good, but I do not think that considerable numbers of people died because of malnutrition. Perhaps this personal memories of individuals do not withstand statistical testing and could be biased because the months before May 1945 were a lot more challenging. But by simply taking a walk at a any random graveyard in Germany or Austria, you will see that no considerably above-average accumulation of deceases are noticeable after May 1945 - before yes! And there has not been such a chaos, that mass graves were dug and deceased ones were buried without records.

In general I think it is good, that the USA and the UK also reassess their recent history, but when a discussions like this one is done by Germans or Austrians, it has a little bit of a strange touch. So I think the Americans should discuss this topic on their own and it would be best for us here to just translate the English article into German. --El bes 02:25, 14. Nov. 2007 (CET)

Thanks. I have some thoughts what you wrote on starvation. I guess it depends on what "considerable" numbers means. Doubling or tripling the infant mortality rate may not give very visible victims or very many victims in absolute numbers.

Although the Allied history is being reevaluated, (see this example) the reevaluation is exceedingly slow, and risks drowning in the old myths perpetuated in many more books. The book documenting the tens of thousands raped by American soldiers in Europe (Taken by force, by J. Robert Lilly) was not even possible to publish in the U.S.[25].

I don't know how to explain your example regarding graveyards, except to offer some possible theories.

Most of the victims were likely small children and infant babies, are they buried in the same places in the graveyards? Perhaps they are cremated and the ashes spread in "memorial meadows" in the cemeteries?

Most deaths would have taken place in the cities in highly industrialized regions such as the Ruhr, the countryside areas should have been better able to obtain the minimum needed to survive. I know there were food riots in Hamburg, since I read it in an old time article. I couldn't find it just now, so I settle for two less interesting alternatives. Hunger, Coal.

--- My mistake. I found the article I was referring to. Is Anybody Hungry? from April 1946. It does not mention food riots as I wrongly remembered, but does mention "hunger raids on 60 Hamburg bread stores" and "first definite signs of starvation were apparent in the city". I also found an article from October 1945 Trouble in Germany: "Most [American] people had the notion that Potsdam [the Potsdam Conference] once & for all had turned Germany into a country of fields and pastures [more or less the Morgenthau plan], with a factory here & there to relieve the bucolic monotony. Actually, under the general terms of the Potsdam Agreement, Germany could have a substantial light industry [beer, clothes, toys..]." Reacting to a proposal to interpret the Potsdam decision less harshly general Eisenhower (then in charge of the U.S. occupation zone, later U.S. president) stated his support for the punitive policy against the Germans. . ". . . I say let Germany find out what it means to start a war.". --Stor stark7 20:18, 27. Dez. 2007 (CET)

It is possible that people were unwilling to speak about those years. My impression is that the generation that followed, those Germans born in the late 40's 50's 60's became very accusative of the wartime generation, and would not be willing to listen to stories about suffering which might serve to diminish the Nazi era crimes. This is just my impression though from reading articles for example women only recently revealing that they were group raped by Russians, and then to their grandchildren, not to their children. I have however nothing more concrete to back it up with.

One example of American unwillingness to listen to stories of German suffering due to this theory of collective guilt is the story of this poor child who with her family was kept in one of the Polish concentration camps for many years after the war. Martha Kent. Eine Porzellanscherbe im Graben: Eine deutsche Fluechtlingskindheit. The Germans had no right to speak of their suffering. If faced with this type of attitude I would also prefer to suffer in silence.

Another example of silence is the case of the German children in Denmark. There are hundreds of thousands of Germans who lived through this suffering in Denmark, but nothing was ever spoken of it in Germany. It took a Danish doctor walking past a cemetery and wondering about all the children tombstones to briefly expose the issue. By now the witnesses are mostly gone, so had she not done her discovery when she did we might never have known about it.[26], [27], [28], [29]. I (slightly melodramatically, I know) wonder what other stories are being forgotten for ever.

On the theme of silence the rapes also come in. For example the book by Martha Hillers, A woman in Berlin[30], [31], which was not very well received when it was published in the 50's, but recently republished was a bestseller. I once leafed through the book, and my impression was that when she heard of the Nazi crimes she considered what happened to her as just retribution. "To the rest of the world we're nothing but rubble women and trash." Essentially, in the 50's nobody wanted to talk about it.

The people of Berlin probably had a tough time just trying to survive, this book gives the impression that just about every woman aged 14 to 50 had to become a prostitute to survive. Of course you'd afterwards want to forget such bad times and what you had to do to survive during them. Berlin Twilight, 1947. Would you really want to know if your mother was living in Berlin then?

The site the book comes from is to be recommended, it is full of material, other books, news pamphlets etc: http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/History/Browse.html

Sadly, the children of such and similar unions is another usually forgotten chapter, see en:War children. At least by December 1946 the U.S. laws were changed and it was no longer illegal for U.S. soldiers to marry German women, should they so desire. If they did not want to marry them the women had not very much to hope for, certainly not financial support since the Americans controlled the West German courts until 1955.

If any of the information provided to support my "silence" theories is new to those reading this, there are a few possible reasons. 1. I might be wrong, which is a distinct possibility although I try to provide reliable sources. 2. The information is not really noteworthy so its only natural that it is unknown. 3. There are other reasons for the silence on the topics. What do I know, all I know is that I used up another hour of precious sleep, sadly without adding to the article in question, i.e. the Morgenthau plan. Cheers --Stor stark7 04:46, 24. Nov. 2007 (CET)

I am surprised nothing has happened to correct this article. Some more links for the weak hearted. Did the United States Create Democracy in Germany? German Economic "Miracle" and The Marshall Plan at 60: The General’s Successful War On Poverty--Stor stark7 01:40, 25. Mär. 2008 (CET)

Dear Swedish friend, you are dumping a lot of primary and secondary sources here on the discussion page and than you expect us to read all this stuff and to make an article out of it, in a way you would appreciate. That just won't happen. Why don't you start with the article at the Swedish Wikipedia, that is still quite short. Or you join the discussion at the English Wikipedia and when they have a balanced article with good information at the end, we'll translate it into German.

The lack of interest from native German speakers towards this topic only shows that there is no big discussion in Germany about it and only few people are doing research to proof how evil the Americans were. As a matter of fact, at the moment there is a public discussion in the media, especially in Austria but also in Germany, that the Americans were much too soft towards the former Nazi-officials and party members and a lot of people regret, that the "Entnazifizierung" (Denazification) was stopped because of the upcoming Cold War. I post this, just to let you know a bit about that, not because I want to convince you to something in any way. --El bes 03:19, 25. Mär. 2008 (CET)

In my opinion lack of interest is no excuse for allowing very evident factual errors remain in an article, it lowers the credibility of the whole project. I apologize if I provided too many sources and as per your request I will stop now after this communication, but I hope someone who in earnest wished to improve this article will eventually at least browse through them. The latest links contain a short UN paper on the switch to the Marshall plan, which describes U.S. President Hoovers warning from 1947 (after 2 years of occupation under the morgenthau plan) that if the Morgenthau plan was continued to its conclusion they would have to exterminate roughly 25 million Germans. The others contain amongst other things some economic data.

Since denazification is a "hot" topic right now you would perhaps be interested in reading the research paper from the Independent Institute that I also link to in my post from yesterday, "Did the United States Create Democracy in Germany?". It deals with the American denazification process quite exhaustively. Please compare it with what the media are saying, it would be interesting to know what facts (if any..) Austrian media are too incompetent to dig up. As a side note, I collected some other sources on denazification that could be interesting to some, on the American "collective guilt" propaganda campaign: German collective guilt. I wonder how lasting the effects were.--Stor stark7 11:33, 25. Mär. 2008 (CET)